The Market for Talent: Competition for Resources and Self-Governance in Teams
Abhijit Ramalingam,
Brock Stoddard and
James Walker
No 18-18, Working Papers from Department of Economics, Appalachian State University
Abstract:
In a laboratory setting, we investigate the effect of competition for the resources of team members with ‘divided loyalties’, and the role of such competition in overcoming the free-rider problem associated with the provision of team-level public goods. We find that competition alone creates ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. However, if groups have access to more information on the actions of team members, or are able to determine their membership through ostracism, they are more successful in attracting the ‘loyalties’ of team members. By eschewing the study of additional mechanisms that require external intervention or alterations of payoff functions, our work highlights the potential of implicit competition in promoting cooperation. Key Words: public goods, experiment, divided loyalties, competition, resources, endogenous membership
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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http://econ.appstate.edu/RePEc/pdf/wp1818.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: The market for talent: Competition for resources and self-governance in teams (2019) 
Working Paper: The Market for Talent: Competition for Resources and Self- Governance in Teams (2018) 
Working Paper: The market for talent: Competition for resources and self governance in teams (2016) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:apl:wpaper:18-18
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