Balanced contributions, consistency, and value for games with externalities

Andr\'e Casajus, Yukihiko Funaki and Frank Huettner

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Abstract: We consider fair and consistent extensions of the Shapley value for games with externalities. Based on the restriction identified by Casajus et al. (2024, Games Econ. Behavior 147, 88-146), we define balanced contributions, Sobolev's consistency, and Hart and Mas-Colell's consistency for games with externalities, and we show that these properties lead to characterizations of the generalization of the Shapley value introduced by Macho-Stadler et al. (2007, J. Econ. Theory 135, 339-356), that parallel important characterizations of the Shapley value.

Date: 2025-11
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