A general definition of perfect equilibrium

J\'anos Flesch, Christopher Kops, Dries Vermeulen and Anna Zseleva

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We propose a general definition of perfect equilibrium which is applicable to a wide class of games. A key feature is the concept of completely mixed nets of strategies, based on a more detailed notion of carrier of a strategy. Under standard topological conditions, this definition yields a nonempty and compact set of perfect equilibria. For finite action sets, our notion of perfect equilibrium coincides with Selten's (1975) original notion. In the compact-continuous case, perfect equilibria are weak perfect equilibria in the sense of Simon and Stinchcombe (1995). In the finitely additive case, perfect equilibria in the sense of Marinacci (1997) are perfect. Under mild conditions, perfect equilibrium meets game-theoretic desiderata such as limit undominatedness and invariance. We provide a variety of examples to motivate and illustrate our definition. Notably, examples include applications to games with discontinuous payoffs and games played with finitely additive strategies.

Date: 2025-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2511.16367 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2511.16367

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().