EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The Performance of REIT Acquirers in the Post-Merger Period

Chris Ratcliffe, Bill Dimovski () and Monica Keneley

ERES from European Real Estate Society (ERES)

Abstract: Mergers and acquisitions are a feature of modern economies. However, research on conventional bidding firms in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has shown, on average, shareholders are worse off in the long-run (Alexandridis, Mavrovitis and Travlos, 2012). This study examines the long-term post merger performance of US Equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to see if this under-performance extends to the largest REIT sector in the world. In contrast to the earlier REIT data samples used by Campbell, Giambona and Sirmans (2009), we find, prior to the macroeconomic event of the financial crisis, that existing shareholders of bidding firms earn significant and positive abnormal returns. This outcome supports the synergy motive for M&As in the REIT sector. Results from announcements occurring after the onset of the financial crisis show signs of negative and significant abnormal returns, suggesting these M&As were driven by the agency and/or hubris motive.

Keywords: Equity REITs; Mergers and acquisitions; Post-merger abnormal returns (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: R3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://eres.architexturez.net/doc/oai-eres-id-eres2017-43 (text/html)
https://eres.architexturez.net/system/files/43.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arz:wpaper:eres2017_43

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ERES from European Real Estate Society (ERES) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Architexturez Imprints ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:arz:wpaper:eres2017_43