Constitutional pluralism and legal perspectivism in European Union law Abstract: During the past decade, new theories of (constitutional) pluralism have challenged the classic authority and primacy of EU law as asserted by the classic jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. This school of thought, represented by many different authors, has tried to construct a new horizontal relationship between legal orders and European supreme jurisdictions. Constitutional pluralism has enjoyed doctrinal success but also received harsh criticism. This study reviews the most important literature and argues that the (constitutional) pluralism diverse strands of scholarship represent a continuation of what, in philosophical terms, can be termed “legal perspectivism” as conceptualized by Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset in 1923. It explores the question when EU law should have higher authority and primacy over national constitutional laws from both classic and new perspectives. No legal theory of EU constitutional law has so far been universally accepted by all actors. It concludes with the finding that the critique to the unconditional authority of EU law that constitutional pluralists have brought to the European field is still alive and extremely relevant both in theory and in practice. Classification-JEL: K10, K33

Mendez-Pinedo, M. Elvira

Constitutional pluralism and legal perspectivism in European Union law Abstract: During the past decade, new theories of (constitutional) pluralism have challenged the classic authority and primacy of EU law as asserted by the classic jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. This school of thought, represented by many different authors, has tried to construct a new horizontal relationship between legal orders and European supreme jurisdictions. Constitutional pluralism has enjoyed doctrinal success but also received harsh criticism. This study reviews the most important literature and argues that the (constitutional) pluralism diverse strands of scholarship represent a continuation of what, in philosophical terms, can be termed “legal perspectivism” as conceptualized by Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset in 1923. It explores the question when EU law should have higher authority and primacy over national constitutional laws from both classic and new perspectives. No legal theory of EU constitutional law has so far been universally accepted by all actors. It concludes with the finding that the critique to the unconditional authority of EU law that constitutional pluralists have brought to the European field is still alive and extremely relevant both in theory and in practice. Classification-JEL: K10, K33

M. Elvira Mendez-Pinedo

Juridical Tribune - Review of Comparative and International Law, 2020, vol. 10, issue 1, 5-35

Keywords: European constitutional law; European integration; legal pluralism; literature; legal perspectivism. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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