Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games

Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler and Burkhard Schipper
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Peter Dürsch

No 529, Working Papers from University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics

Abstract: We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games.

Keywords: Imitate-the-best; learning; exact potential games; symmetric games; relative payoffs; zero-sum games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
Note: This paper is part of http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/view/schriftenreihen/sr-3.html
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Working Paper: Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games (2011)
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