Changing Collective Action: Norm-Nudges and Team Decisions

Florian Diekert and Tillmann Eymess
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Christoph Vanberg

No 709, Working Papers from University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics

Abstract: We test whether a descriptive norm-nudge is a suitable policy tool to increase cooperation in a social dilemma when decisions are taken by teams, not individuals. Each team in our experiment comes from a different fishing boat at Lake Victoria, Tanzania. The provision of a norm-nudge is randomized across two decision making mechanisms, enabling us to identify experience with egalitarian or hierarchical decision structures, both present at Lake Victoria. The descriptive norm-nudge increases cooperation by 14 and 16 percentage points for egalitarian and hierarchical team decisions, respectively. Captains from boats with hierarchical organization are particularly responsive.

Keywords: collective action; team decisions; norm-nudges; common pool resources (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-01-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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