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Strategic Ignorance and Perceived Control

Anca Balietti, Angelika Budjan, Tillmann Eymess and Alice Solda

No 735, Working Papers from University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics

Abstract: Information can trigger unpleasant emotions. As a result, individuals might be tempted to strategically ignore it. We experimentally investigate whether increasing perceived control can mitigate strategic ignorance. Participants from India were presented with a choice to receive information about the health risk associated with air pollution and were later asked to recall it. Perceived control leads to a substantial improvement in information recall. We find that optimists react most to perceived control, both with a reduction in information avoidance and an increase in information recall. This latter result is supported by a US sample. A theoretical framework rationalizes our findings.

Keywords: information avoidance; information recall; perceived control; motivated cognition; air pollution; Luftverschmutzung (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-09-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-exp, nep-ger and nep-hea
Note: This paper is part of http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/view/schriftenreihen/sr-3.html
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