Corruption in the Tax Administration: Is there Scope for Wage Incentives?

Konstantin Pashev, Neven Valev and Vanya Pasheva
Additional contact information
Neven Valev: Department of Economics, Georgia State University
Vanya Pasheva: The World Bank

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU from International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: We use unique survey data from Bulgaria’s tax administration to evaluate the determinants of corruption risk. We construct a novel measure of corruptibility, defined as the gap between actual income and the self-reported corruption-proof income. The survey data show that raising incomes leads to lower corruption risk. However, incomes would have to almost triple to eliminate the risk of corruption, which makes such a policy intervention politically and financially unfeasible. The results suggest that strengthening monitoring and control might be more cost-effective for addressing corruption risks in the case of the tax administration in Bulgaria. They also suggest that gender, age, and tenure can be used to inform human resource allocation.

Keywords: taxes; corruption; wage policy; Bulgaria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2010-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2015/03/ispwp1023.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper1023

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU from International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paul Benson ().