The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games

Francesc Llerena, Marina Núñez () and Carles Rafels
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Carles Rafels: Universitat de Barcelona
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francesc Llerena Garrés

No 246, Working Papers in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia

JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 0 pages
Date: 2010
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