Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers & state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain

Marta Curto-Grau (Universitat de Barcelona), Albert Sole-Olle (Universitat de Barcelona) and Pilar Sorribas-Navarro ()

No 288, Working Papers in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia

Abstract: We examine whether state-level incumbents discriminate in the allocation of transfers in favour of local governments controlled by co-partisans, and whether the electoral prospects of local incumbents improve when they are aligned with the state incumbent. Using a new database covering around 3,000 Spanish municipalities during the period 2000-07 and a Regression Discontinuity design, we document a very strong and robust effect: in close races, municipalities aligned with the regional government obtain on average 83% more per capita transfers and their incumbents gain 10% more votes at the local elections. We also show that the effect of alignment is stronger: (i) when regional and local elections are held on the same day, (ii) in regions with less competitive regional elections, and (ii) in regions with more budget resources.

JEL-codes: C2 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 0 pages
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-geo, nep-pbe and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bar:bedcje:2012288

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