Promotion Tournaments with Multiple Tasks

Fumi Kiyotaki

No 804, Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance from Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics

Abstract: This article analyses promotion tournaments where candidates engage in multiple tasks. We consider a promotion rule where the winner of the promotion tournament is randomly selected from the best performers at each task. The promotion tournament can achieve an efficient outcome for any production uncertainty (observability) of tasks and substitutability in the effort cost when employees are risk neutral and homogeneous. The promotion decision should be based much more on the outcome in a more uncertain task. If employees are heterogeneous in their ability to undertake a task, then the outcome of an ability-dependent task should be relied upon more in the promotion decision than the outcome of a simple task.

JEL-codes: D82 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/7592 First version, 2008 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bbk:bbkefp:0804

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance from Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).