Central Bank Independence, Bureaucratic Corruption and Fiscal Responses - Empirical Evidence

Ourania Dimakou
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Ourania Dimakou: Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics, Birkbeck

No 1012, Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance from Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics

Abstract: This paper analyses the impact of bureaucratic corruption on fiscal policy outcomes for economies that have constituted to a greater or lessen extent independent central banks. The adverse implications of corruption on debt accumulation are verified using a cross-sectional setting of 77 developed and developing countries. Approximating central bank independence as that point in time that a major central bank reform took effect, we find that more corruption leads to higher debt accumulation. More importantly, complementing the analysis with a measure for the level of independence each reform gave strengthens the results; the impact of corruption is greater, the higher the independence that was granted. The findings are robust to different subsets of the sample and different sets of control variables. Suboptimal institutional quality poses difficulties on the achievement of a balanced debt process, which could obstacle price stability, despite the constitution of independent central banks.

Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-mon
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https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/7530 First version, 2010 (application/pdf)

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