The Agency Theory Applied to the Investment Funds

Flavia Zoboli Dalmacio and Valcemiro Nossa
Additional contact information
Flavia Zoboli Dalmacio: FUCAPE - Capixaba Foundation for Research in Accounting, Economy and Finance
Valcemiro Nossa: FUCAPE - Capixaba Foundation for Research in Accounting, Economy and Finance

Brazilian Business Review, 2004, vol. 1, issue 1, 31-44

Abstract: This article seeks to verify the existence of a relationship between the rate of remuneration charged by the administrators of investment funds and the profitability of these portfolios, under the perspective of the Agency Theory. The Agency Theory seeks to explain the conflicts of interest that can arise from the contractual relationship between a principal and an agent. The agent is the individual who, motivated by his own interests, undertakes to do certain tasks for the principal. This work was developed from a bibliographical review and, based on experimental research, empirical investigations were made, the principal object of which was the test of the hypothesis with relation to cause-effect that could exist between the administration tax and the profitability of the investment funds. However, the results obtained by means of the use of statistical tests did not sustain the hypothesis raised in this work.

Keywords: agency theory; conflict of interests; investment funds (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/download/490/742 Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bbz:fcpbbr:v:1:y:2004:i:1:p:31-44

Access Statistics for this article

Brazilian Business Review is currently edited by Emerson Mainardes

More articles in Brazilian Business Review from Fucape Business School Fucape Business School Brazilian Business Review Av. Fernando Ferrari, 1358, Boa Vista CEP 29075-505 Vitória-ES. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sarah Lasso ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).