Limiting Sender’s Information in Bayesian Persuasion

Shota Ichihashi

Staff Working Papers from Bank of Canada

Abstract: This paper studies how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on a sender’s information. I study a game in which, prior to the sender’s information disclosure, the designer can restrict the most informative signal that the sender can generate. In the binary action case, I consider arbitrary preferences of the designer and characterize all equilibrium outcomes. As a corollary, I solve a problem of how to maximize a receiver’s payoffs by restricting the sender’s information: Whenever the designer can increase the receiver’s payoffs by restricting the sender’s information, the receiver-optimal way coincides with an equilibrium of the game in which the receiver persuades the sender.

Keywords: Economic; models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2019-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Limiting Sender's information in Bayesian persuasion (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bca:bocawp:19-10

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