Outside Investor Access to Top Management: Market Monitoring versus Stock Price Manipulation

Josef Schroth

Staff Working Papers from Bank of Canada

Abstract: This paper studies the role of voluntary disclosure in crowding out independent research about firm value. In the model, when inside firm owners make it easier for outside investors to obtain inexpensive biased information from the manager, investors rely less on costly unbiased research. As a result, managers are tempted to manipulate the firm stock price more, but investors are better informed because they anticipate manager manipulation. An increase in stock-price informativeness, therefore, has to be traded off against an increase in resources wasted on manipulation. I find that, surprisingly, firm owners grant investors more access to managers that manipulate more strongly. An implication is that the firm cost of capital is negatively related to manager manipulation.

Keywords: Economic models; Financial markets; Recent economic and financial developments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 G14 G32 G34 M12 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2020-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bca:bocawp:20-43

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