The Role of Long-Term Contracting in Business Lending

Phoebe Tian

Staff Working Papers from Bank of Canada

Abstract: This paper examines inefficiencies arising from a lack of long-term contracting in small business lending in China. I develop and estimate a dynamic model where firms repeatedly interact with the same lender. All loans are short-term. Collateral can be used to deter a strategic default by a firm, but the lender cannot recover the full value of the collateral in the case of a default. The endogenous contract terms—including interest rates, loan size and collateral—reflect a firm’s probability of default in equilibrium. Learning drives the dynamics of contract terms because a firm’s profitability type is unknown. Long-term contracts improve welfare mainly by mitigating the incentives for a firm to default.

Keywords: Financial; institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D86 G21 L14 L26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 71 pages
Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cfn, nep-cta, nep-dge and nep-fdg
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