Capital (and Earnings) Incentives for Loan Loss Provisions in Brazil: evidence from a crisis-buffering regulatory intervention

Ricardo Schechtman and Tony Takeda

No 477, Working Papers Series from Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department

Abstract: In order to provide higher incentives for loan loss provisions (LLP) of Brazilian banks when bad times were looming ahead, the discretionary excess in loan loss reserves was recognized temporarily as regulatory capital, in a sort of countercyclical policy. This study explores this regulatory change to investigate the capital management incentives of LLP of Brazilian banks. Results show that banks with less regulatory capital increased relatively more discretionary LLP during the regulatory change but not outside it, suggesting that capital management through discretionary LLP was relevant only during that period. On the other hand, banks with less earnings made less discretionary LLP throughout the sample period, suggesting earnings smoothing was relevant during the whole period. Results are robust to different realized and forward loan loss controls, different measures of capital before endogenous items, time-varying capital targets, and to the recognition of possible heterogeneous effects of the global financial crisis across Brazilian banks.

Date: 2018-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba and nep-lam
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.bcb.gov.br/content/publicacoes/WorkingPaperSeries/wps477.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bcb:wpaper:477

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers Series from Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Rodrigo Barbone Gonzalez ().