The independence of economic authorities and supervisors. The case of the Banco de España. Testimony by the Governor of the Banco de España before the Audit Committee on Democratic Quality / Congress of Deputies, 22 December 2020

Pablo Hernández de Cos

No 2105, Occasional Papers from Banco de España

Abstract: In his testimony, the Governor’s analysis of the impartiality and autonomy of independent economic authorities contributes to the Committee’s review of the “measures needed to strengthen the impartiality and independence of independent authorities and regulatory agencies”. He first reviews the arguments warranting the independence of economic authorities and supervisors. He then goes on to address the features that conform an institution’s formal independence, detailing their specific form in the case of the Banco de España. Next, he reflects on the status of independence as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the proper performance by independent agencies of their functions. He then highlights possible measures for strengthening the independence of the Banco de España, and identifies potential improvements to the financial supervision model in Spain. Lastly, he refers to the Bank’s control mechanisms and transparency standards, and certain aspects of its governance.

Keywords: independent economic authorities; independent agencies; economic supervisors; independence; accountability; transparency; governance; central bank; governor; financial supervision model; code of conduct; collegiate decisions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 E61 F55 G28 K1 Y80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2021-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc and nep-mac
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https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicac ... s/21/Fich/do2105.pdf Spanish version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bde:opaper:2105e

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