Incentive compatible relationship between the ERM II and close cooperation in the Banking Union: the cases of Bulgaria and Croatia

María J. Nieto () and Dalvinder Singh ()
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María J. Nieto: Banco de España
Dalvinder Singh: University of Warwick

No 2117, Occasional Papers from Banco de España

Abstract: The goal of expanding participation in the European Banking Union was to allow the “outs” to enter into close cooperation, but it did not include the simultaneous joining of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II). Focusing on the cases of Bulgaria and Croatia, this paper attempts to respond to various questions. What is the rationale behind the double requirement of having simultaneously to apply to become a member of the ERM II and to prepare to become a member of the Banking Union via the rule-based “close-cooperation” coordination mechanism between the EU non-euro-area national competent authorities (NCAs) and the European Central Bank (ECB)? Does the integration of close-cooperation countries’ banking systems with the euro-area banking systems support the decision to join the ERM II and “opting in” to the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)? What are the advantages of preparing to become a full member of the euro area and the SSM? It is evident from the research undertaken in this paper that there are clear benefits of close cooperation for these member states whose domestic currencies are already linked to the euro, in view of the dominant position eurozone banks have in their respective domestic markets. It is more difficult for a national central bank or NCA to exercise discretion in implementing ECB decisions once it is committed to the path leading to full European Monetary Union (EMU) membership. Hence the commitment to join the EMU minimises the authority risk for the ECB as well as for the Single Resolution Board, as safeguards become non-significant and termination is not an issue. The uncertainty about the functioning and durability of the close-cooperation arrangement is largely removed.

Keywords: Banking Union; close cooperation; ERM II (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E02 E44 F15 G15 G21 H12 K23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2021-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-eec, nep-mac, nep-mon and nep-opm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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