Cross-border coordination of prudential supervision And deposit guarantees

Daniel C. Hardy () and María J. Nieto ()
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Daniel C. Hardy: International Monetary Fund
María J. Nieto: Banco de España

No 1126, Working Papers from Banco de España

Abstract: We study the optimal joint design of prudential supervision and deposit guarantee regulations in a multi-country, integrated banking market, where policy-makers have preferences regarding profitability and stability of the banking sector. Non-coordinated policies will tend to yield too little supervision and too much deposit insurance. The paper concludes with recommendations on policy priorities in this area.

Keywords: Deposit guarantees; bank supervision; cross-border coordination; EU (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F36 F59 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2011-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cis and nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bde:wpaper:1126

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