Regulatory bias in the price structure of local telephone services

Carlos Carlos Perez Montes ()
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Carlos Carlos Perez Montes: Banco de España

No 1201, Working Papers from Banco de España

Abstract: This article combines a discrete choice model of demand for residential local telephone access and an optimal price regulation model to estimate the welfare weights that state regulators place on consumers with different incomes and locations. I find no evidence of a bias towards rural consumers on average, but the relative weight on low income consumers in a geographic area can vary as a function of the proportions of rural and poor population and the political characteristics of the regulator. I also measure the welfare consequences of deviating from total consumer surplus maximization and disconnecting prices from costs

Keywords: Ramsey prices; regulatory bias; welfare analysis; telecommunications; GMM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 76 pages
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bde:wpaper:1201

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