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Procurement managers and effective tendering: The case of Italian public works contracts

Audinga Baltrunaite, Enza Maltese (), Tommaso Orlando () and Gabriele Rovigatti
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Enza Maltese: Bank of Italy
Tommaso Orlando: Bank of Italy

No 803, Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area

Abstract: This paper studies whether and how much procurement managers matter for effective procurement outcomes. We utilize detailed data on Italian procurement for public works, and on the identity of public officials responsible for their tendering and execution. Our analysis shows that, ceteris paribus and even within the same procuring agency, the managers' identity matters for effective procurement. We further leverage institutional reforms that tightened the eligibility criteria for procurement managing roles as a natural experiment to evaluate the correlation between managerial quality and procurement performance. Key performance indicators include the duration of administrative procedures for tender awarding and the completion time for public works. Our findings suggest a direct positive relationship between the caliber of procurement managers and the expediency of both tender awarding and project completion.

Keywords: public procurement; public works; public managers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H54 H57 R58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_803_23

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