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Social mobility and endogenous cycles in redistribution

Francesco Zollino ()
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Francesco Zollino: Banca d'Italia

No 505, Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area

Abstract: By allowing median voter�s location and preferred policy to change over time, a variety of redistributive policies results in the long-run with no unique relationship to inequality. Single outcome depends on the interaction between the pure economic structure and policy action in determining wealth distribution over time. The standard positive correlation between redistribution and inequality is confirmed when the pattern of social mobility, potentially prevailing in a free market, proves robust to public action. Otherwise the non-linear relationship found in recent literature is confirmed. With balanced intensity of backward and upward mobility in free market, policy cycles endogenously arise, with inequality shrinking and enlarging periodically and counter-cyclically.

Keywords: social mobility; political cycle; credit rationing; redistributive policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 E62 I38 O41 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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