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Cyclical asymmetry in fiscal policy, debt accumulation and the Treaty of Maastricht

Fabrizio Balassone and Maura Francese

No 531, Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area

Abstract: In this paper we present a stylised framework of fiscal policy determination that considers both structural targets and cyclical factors. Applying this framework to a sample of 16 OECD countries, we find evidence of significant asymmetry in the reaction of fiscal policy to positive and negative cyclical conditions, with budgetary balances deteriorating in contractions and not improving in expansions. This asymmetry appears to have contributed significantly to debt accumulation. We find no evidence that EU fiscal rules have reduced the ability of governments to conduct stabilisation policy between 1992 and 2000.

Keywords: stabilization; fiscal policy; government debt; fiscal rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 H6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (49)

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Working Paper: Cyclical Asymmetry in Fiscal Policy, Debt Accumulation and the Treaty of Maastricht (2010) Downloads
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