Hiring incentives and labour force participation in Italy
Piero Cipollone (),
Corrado Di Maria and
Anita Guelfi ()
No 552, Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area
Abstract:
A long-standing economic tradition maintains that labour supply reacts to market tightness; its sensitivity to job quality has received less attention. If firms hire workers with both temporary and open-end contracts, does participation increase when more permanent jobs are available? We investigate this relationship within a policy evaluation framework; in particular, we examine how labour supply reacted in Italy to a recent subsidy in favour of open-end contracts. This subsidy increased labour force participation by 1.4% in 2001 and 2.1% in 2002. This increase was concentrated on males aged 35-54, with a low or at most a secondary schooling level, and might be due to the choice to leave undegraound economy.
Keywords: labour supply; program evaluation; temporary contracts; open-end contracts; shadow economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 H25 J22 J38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Journal Article: Hiring Incentives and Labour Force Participation in Italy (2004) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_552_05
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