Why do (or did?) banks securitize their loans? Evidence from Italy

Massimiliano Affinito and Edoardo Tagliaferri ()
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Edoardo Tagliaferri: Banca d'Italia

No 741, Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area

Abstract: This paper investigates the ex-ante determinants of bank loan securitization by using different econometric methods on Italian individual bank data from 2000 to 2006. Our results show that bank loan securitization is a composite decision. Banks that are less capitalized, less profitable, less liquid and burdened with troubled loans are more likely to perform securitization, for a larger amount and earlier.

Keywords: securitization; credit risk transfer; capital requirements; liquidity needs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 C24 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-bec, nep-cfn and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (70)

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Journal Article: Why do (or did?) banks securitize their loans? Evidence from Italy (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_741_10

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