Strategic Spending in Voting Competitions with Social Networks

Lever Guzmán Carlos

No 2010-16, Working Papers from Banco de México

Abstract: This paper proposes a model of voting competitions (political campaigns and strategic lobbying) where voters are influenced by the opinion of their neighbors on a social network. In the unique pure strategy nash equilibrium, resources are targeted toward individuals with an influential position in the network. This finding contrasts with previous theories of strategic spending which predict that parties (or lobbies) should spend more on individuals who have a higher probability of being pivotal for the vote. The paper then tests the model using data on campaign contributions by interests groups in the US. House of Representatives. The estimations show that both network influence and pivotality are significant predictors of campaign contributions.

JEL-codes: D72 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-net, nep-pol, nep-soc and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdm:wpaper:2010-16

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