Assortative Matching and the Education Gap

Ximena Peña

Borradores de Economia from Banco de la Republica de Colombia

Abstract: This paper attempts to explain the decrease and reversal of the education gap between males and females. Given a continuum of agents, the education decisions are modelled as an assignment game with endogenous types. In the first stage agents choose their education level and in the second they participate in the labor and marriage markets. Competition among potential matches ensures that the efficient education levels can always be sustained in equilibrium, but there may be inefficient equilibria. Combining asymmetries intrinsic to the modelled markets the model reproduces the observed education gap.

Keywords: Assortative matching; efficiency; gender; education. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-hrm and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.32468/be.427 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Assortative Matching and the Education Gap (2006)
Working Paper: Assortative Matching and the Education Gap (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdr:borrec:427

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Borradores de Economia from Banco de la Republica de Colombia Cra 7 # 14-78. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Clorith Angélica Bahos Olivera ().