Political Alignment in the Time of Weak Parties: Electoral Advantages and Subnational Transfers in Colombia

Leonardo Bonilla-Mejía () and Iván Higuera-Mendieta
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Leonardo Bonilla Mejia

Documentos de trabajo sobre Economía Regional y Urbana from Banco de la Republica de Colombia

Abstract: This paper explores the effect of alignment between local and national politics in a context of weak parties. Based on a regression discontinuity design in close elections, we find that, in absence of strong parties, presidential coalitions become the focal point of political alignment in Colombia. In fact, while parties provide almost no electoral advantages to their members, candidates aspiring to national positions get significantly more votes in municipalities governed by mayors aligned with the incoming presidential coalitions. In turn, aligned mayors receive additional discretionary transfers from the National Government to finance road investments. These discretionary transfers, however, do not translate into local economic growth.

Keywords: Political alignment; elections; subnational transfers; regression discontinuity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H72 H77 R11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47
Date: 2017-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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https://doi.org/10.32468/dtseru.260 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Political Alignment in the Time of Weak Parties: Electoral Advantages and Subnational Transfers in Colombia (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdr:region:260

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