Homo Moralis' giving tendencies: a multidisciplinary opinion review on altruistic behavior in the dictator game

Francesco Campanella and Michele Mariella ()
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Francesco Campanella: Department of General Psychology, University of Padua
Michele Mariella: Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome

Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, 2024, vol. 8, issue S2, 43-49

Abstract: This article explores the interaction between the moral principle of protection/harm and fairness tendencies expressed by allocators in Dictator Games. Through a multidisciplinary perspective, the analysis evaluates how these intuitive moral evaluations influence altruistic and prosocial behaviors, challenging traditional economic models based on the Homo Economicus. The study aims to collect the scientific results of moral psychology to investigate a comprehensive experimental manipulation of harm in social economic games. We argue that this developments in economics and psychology research, may be effective, especially in policies from taxation to military intervention, fields in which aversion to harming others are significantly relevant.

Keywords: moral intuitions; dictator game; evidence-based policies; altruistic behavior; moral decision-making; harm aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:beh:jbepv1:v:8:y:2024:i:s2:p:43-49

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