Reversing the Resource Curse: Foreign Corruption Regulation and Economic Development

Hans Christensen (hans.christensen@chicagobooth.edu), Mark Maffett (mark.maffett@chicagobooth.edu) and Thomas Rauter (thomas.rauter@chicagobooth.edu)
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Hans Christensen: University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Mark Maffett: University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Thomas Rauter: University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

No 2020-155, Working Papers from Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics

Abstract: We examine whether foreign corruption regulation reduces corruption and increases the local economic benefits of resource extraction. After a mid-2000s increase in enforcement of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), economic activity (measured by nighttime luminosity) increases by 14% (3%) in African communities within a 10- (25-) kilometer radius of resource extraction facilities whose owners are subject to the FCPA. Local perceptions of corruption decline by 8%. Consistent with changes in existing extraction firms’ business practices contributing to the increase in development, the association between resource production, instrumented by world commodity prices, and local economic activity increases by 40%.

Keywords: Foreign corruption regulation; Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA); economic development; natural resource extraction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F50 F60 K2 M4 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 69 pages
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-env and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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