Selection on Welfare Gains: Experimental Evidence from Electricity Plan Choice

Koichiro Ito, Takanori Ida () and Makoto Tanaka
Additional contact information
Takanori Ida: Kyoto University

No 2021-12, Working Papers from Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics

Abstract: We study a problem in which policymakers need to screen self-selected individuals by unobserved heterogeneity in social welfare gains from a policy intervention. In our framework, the marginal treatment effects and marginal treatment responses arise as key statistics to characterize social welfare. We apply this framework to a randomized field experiment on electricity plan choice. Consumers were offered socially efficient dynamic pricing with randomly assigned take-up incentives. We find that price-elastic consumers—who generate larger welfare gains—are more likely to self-select. Our counterfactual simulations quantify the optimal take-up incentives that exploit observed and unobserved heterogeneity in selection and welfare gains.

JEL-codes: L94 Q41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.bfi.uchicago.edu/RePEc/pdfs/BFI_WP_2021-12.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Selection on Welfare Gains: Experimental Evidence from Electricity Plan Choice (2023)
Working Paper: Selection on Welfare Gains: Experimental Evidence from Electricity Plan Choice (2021)
Working Paper: Selection on Welfare Gains: Experimental Evidence from Electricity Plan Choice (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2021-12

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Toni Shears ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).