Rational Inattention to News: The Perils of Forward Guidance

Gaetano Gaballo

Working papers from Banque de France

Abstract: This paper studies the social value of information about the future when agents are rationally inattentive. In a stylized OLG model of inflation the central bank (CB) can set money supply in response to the current price. The CB has perfect foresight about the future T shocks and releases this information to rationally inattentive agents. At the unique REE, individual and aggregate risks can increase with the release when the monetary conduct is not "tight enough" and agents are "not attentive enough" to the news. In particular, the shorter the T, the more attentive the agents must be to avoid perverse welfare effects, whereas the notion of "tight enough" remains invariant. In this sense, efficient communication requires effective monetary policy.

Keywords: Information Acquisition; Central Bank Communication; Monetary Policy; Social Value of Information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 E50 E58 E60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Journal Article: Rational Inattention to News: The Perils of Forward Guidance (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bfr:banfra:416

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