Improving Schools through School Choice: An Experimental Study of Deferred Acceptance

Joana Pais (), Marc Vorsatz and Flip Klijn

No 1119, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: In the context of school choice, we experimentally study the student-optimal stable mechanism where subjects take the role of students and schools are passive. Specifically, we study if a school can be better off when it unambiguously improves in the students' true preferences and its (theoretic) student-optimal stable match remains the same or gets worse. Using first-order stochastic dominance to evaluate the schools' distributions over their actual matches, we find that schools' welfare almost always changes in the same direction as the change of the student-optimal stable matching, i.e., incentives to improve school quality are nearly idle.

Keywords: stability; matching; school choice; deferred acceptance; school quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C91 C92 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-edu, nep-exp and nep-ure
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Journal Article: Improving schools through school choice: An experimental study of deferred acceptance (2020)
Working Paper: Improving Schools through School Choice: An Experimental Study of Deferred Acceptance (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:1119

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