Compromising on Compromise Rules

Danilo Coelho and Salvador BarberÃ

No 1263, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We propose three mechanisms to reach compromise between two opposing par- ties. They are based on the use of Rules of k Names, whereby one of the parties proposes a shortlist and the other chooses from it. Methods of this class are used in practice to appoint Supreme Court justices and have been recently proposed for arbitration selection processes. Our mechanisms are flexible and allow the parties to participate in the endogenous determination of the role of proposer and the shortlist size. They involve few stages, weakly implement the Unanimity Compromise Set and are robust to the strategic inclusion of candidates.

Keywords: The Unanimity Compromise Set; Compromise Rule of k Names; shortlisting contest; alternate shortlists; shortlisting; voting by alternating offers; and vetoes and fallback bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Compromising on compromise rules (2022)
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