Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Perú

Marco Nieddu (), Christopher Neilson, Tim Ederer, Matteo Bobba and Gianmarco León-Ciliotta
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Gianmarco León-Ciliotta ()

No 1273, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We exploit data on the universe of public-school teachers and students in Per´u to es- tablish that wage rigidity makes teachers choose schools based on non-pecuniary factors, magnifying the existing urban-rural gap in student achievement. Leveraging a reform in the teacher compensation structure, we provide causal evidence that increasing salaries in less desirable locations is effective at improving student learning by attracting higher- quality teachers. We then build and estimate a model of teacher sorting across schools and student achievement production, whereby teachers are heterogeneous in their pref- erences over non-wage attributes and their comparative advantages in teaching different student types. Counterfactual compensation policies that leverage information about teachers' preferences and value-added can result in a substantially more efficient and equitable allocation by inducing teachers to sort based on their comparative advantage.

Keywords: inequality; teacher school choice; teacher wages; matching with contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 I21 J31 J45 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-dev and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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