Efficient Full Implementation via Transfers: Uniqueness and Sensitivity in Symmetric Environments

Mariann Ollár and Antonio Penta

No 1311, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We study efficient implementation via transfers in unique rationalizable strategies, in environments that are symmetric in two senses: first, agents display the same total level of preference interdependence; second, types are commonly known to be drawn from distributions with identical (but unknown) means. We characterize the conditions under which full efficient implementation is possible via direct mechanisms, as well as the transfer schemes which achieve it whenever possible. We discuss a further robustness property, robustness to mistaken play, and show that it uniquely selects the transfer scheme which induces an even redistribution of strategic externalities.

Keywords: Rationalizability; robustness; interdependent values; uniqueness; strategic externalities; loading transfers; equal-externality transfers; efficient implementation; full implementation; sensitivity analysis; symmetric environments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:1311

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