Norms and the Evolution of Leaders Followership

Antonio Cabrales and Esther Hauk

No 1381, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we model the interaction between leaders, their followers and crowd followers in a coordination game with local interaction. The steady states of a dynamic best-response process can feature a coexistence of Pareto-dominant and risk-dominant actions in the population. The existence of leaders and their followers, along with the local interaction, which leads to clustering, is crucial for the survival of the Pareto-dominant actions. The evolution of leader and crowd follower- ship shows that leader followership can also be locally stable around Pareto-dominant leaders. The paper answers the questions of which leader should be removed and how to optimally place leaders in the network to enhance payoff-dominant play.

Keywords: networks; Leadership; norms; local interaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-net
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Related works:
Journal Article: Norms and the evolution of leaders' followership (2024)
Working Paper: Norms and the Evolution of Leaders' Followership (2022)
Working Paper: Norms and the evolution of leaders’ followership (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:1381

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