Simultaneous Elections

Enriqueta Aragonès

No 1425, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the possible electoral advantages and disadvantages of a unique party that completes in two simultaneous elections with respect to those obtained when it competes as two different parties. I assume that a uniï¬ ed party has a larger strategy set but it is forced to choose the same policy in both elections. I analyze different scenarios depending on the features of the electorates and of the party conï¬ guration that it faces: the same party or two different parties. In all cases I show that a uniï¬ ed party can only fare better than two independent parties when the two electorates are similar enough. In this case the pasty may obtain the vote of the moderates in both elections. If the electorates are aligned with the opponent the gains from uniï¬ cation are more likely in more polarized electorate. Otherwise, the losses from uniï¬ cation increase with the intensity of the electoral competition.

Keywords: simultaneous elections; state-wide parties; sub-national parties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac, nep-pol and nep-ure
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