To Cut or not to Cut: Deforestation Policy under the Shadow of Foreign Influence

Toke S. Aidt, Facundo Albornoz and Esther Hauk

No 1441, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: This article explores the complex interplay between deforestation policies and foreign influence, using a game theoretical model to analyze geopolitical factors influencing forest conservation decisions in countries with significant rainforests. The model highlights the conflicting interests of foreign powers – one aiming for economic benefits from agriculture and the other advocating for forest preservation to protect environmental services. The paper demonstrates how domestic political dynamics and economic shocks from the international economic influence regulatory decisions on deforestation in the shadow of foreign influence. This understanding is crucial for formulating strategies that balance developmental needs and global environmental concerns.

Keywords: China; foreign influence; Brazil; geopolitics; deforestation; food security; rainforest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 O13 P33 Q23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-env, nep-gth and nep-int
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://bw.bse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/1441-file.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: To cut or not to cut: Deforestation policy under the shadow of foreign influence (2024)
Working Paper: To cut or not to cut: Deforestation policy under the shadow of foreign influence (2024)
Working Paper: To cut or not to cut: Deforestation policy under the shadow of foreign influence (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:1441

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bruno Guallar ().