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Bundling Electronic Journals and Competition among Publishers

Doh-Shin Jeon and Domenico Menicucci

No 270, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Site licensing of electronic journals has been revolutionizing the way academic information is distributed. However, many librarians are concerned about the possibility that commercial publishers might abuse site licensing by practicing bundling. In this paper, we analyze how bundling afects journal pricing in the market of scientific, technical and medical (STM) electronic journals and offer a novel insight on the bundling of a large number of information goods. We find that (i) when bundling is prohibited, surprisingly, industry concentration does not affect prices (ii) when bundling is allowed, each publisher finds bundling profitable and bundling increases industry profits while reducing social welfare and (iii) any merger among publishers already active in the market is profitable but reduces social welfare.

Keywords: Bundling; Journal Pricing; Site Licensing; mergers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 K21 L41 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bundling Electronic Journals and Competition among Publishers (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Bundling electronic journals and competition among publishers (2005) Downloads
Working Paper: bundling electronic journals and competition among publishers (2004) Downloads
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