Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

Effrosyni Diamantoudi (), Licun Xue (), David Pérez-Castrillo and Ines Macho-Stadler
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: David Perez-Castrillo

No 569, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment.

Keywords: shapley value; Externalities; cooperative game theory; linked issues (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues (2015)
Working Paper: Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues (2011)
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