Are Self-regarding Subjects More Rational?

Francesca Pancotto, Marcos Casarin and Benito Arruñada
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Benito Arruñada and Marco Casari

No 611, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Through an experiment, we investigate how the level of rationality relates to concerns for equality and efficiency. Subjects perform dictator games and a guessing game. More rational subjects are not more frequently of the self-regarding type. When performing a comparison within the same degree of rationality, self-regarding subjects show more strategic sophistication than other subjects.

Keywords: steps of reasoning; other-regarding preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Are self-regarding subjects more rational? (2012)
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