Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money

Marilda Sotomayor () and David Pérez-Castrillo
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: David Perez-Castrillo

No 681, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We prove a "General Manipulability Theorem" for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem implies two folk theorems, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, and provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange, 1982, Leonard, 1983, Demange and Gale, 1985).

Keywords: matching; Competitive Equilibrium; manipulability; optimal competitive equilibrium; competitive equilibrium mechanism; competitive equilibrium rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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