Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Performance: The Influence of Boards, Ownership and Institutions

Kurt Desender and Mircea Epure

No 730, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We analyze how ownership concentration and type, and board independence are related to corporate social performance (CSP). Drawing from agency and team production theories, we argue that the distribution of costs and benefits to shareholders and other stakeholders is crucial to understand what drives CSP. We analyze an international panel of listed firms and reveal that CSP is negatively related to ownership concentration, but positively to board independence. Furthermore, the ownership type and the business context matter. Ownership concentration is negatively related to CSP more strongly in shareholder-oriented societies. This negative relationship is weaker in egalitarian societies.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; institutions; Culture; corporate social performance (responsibility); ownership; boards (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 G3 M0 M1 M14 M4 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cdm, nep-cfn, nep-cse, nep-hme and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:730

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