The Titling Role of Possession

Benito Arruñada
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Benito Arruñada

No 767, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: This chapter proposes two hypotheses on the publicity requirement and the limitations of possession to provide information for legal titling. It then tests these hypotheses by examining how legal systems deal with possession in movable and immovable property, and comparing actual and documentary possession. It concludes that exercise of possession is effective as a titling mechanism when it is observed by independent parties, thus providing publicity and verifiability of titling-relevant elements. However, given that possession is only effective to inform about a single in rem right, direct and automatic reliance on possession for titling requires that all other rights be diluted to in personam status or be burdened by the possessory in rem right. In any case, public knowledge of possession, either in its delivery and/or its exercise, is essential for possession to play a public titling function. Similarly, documentary possession is only effective as a public titling mechanism in the absence of multiple rights in rem.

Keywords: transaction costs; enforcement; Property rights; registries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 G38 K11 K12 L85 O17 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Working Paper: The titling role of possession (2014)
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