On the External Validity of Social Preference Games: A Systematic Lab-Field Study

Matteo Galizzi and Daniel Navarro-Martínez

No 802, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We present a lab-field experiment designed to systematically assess the external validity of social preferences elicited in a variety of experimental games. We do this by comparing behavior in the different games with several behaviors elicited in the field and with self-reported behaviors exhibited in the past, using the same sample of participants. Our results show that the experimental social preference games do a poor job explaining both social behaviors in the field and social behaviors from the past.

Keywords: experimental games; social preferences; external validity; field behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 C93 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the External Validity of Social Preference Games: A Systematic Lab-Field Study (2019)
Working Paper: On the external validity of social preference games: a systematic lab-field study (2019)
Working Paper: On the external validity of social-preference games: A systematic lab-field study (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:802

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