Uncertain Rationality and Robustness in Games with Incomplete Information

Peio Zuazo-Garin and Fabrizio Germano

No 814, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: THIS PAPER HAS BEEN SUPERSEDED AND REPLACED BY THE PAPER: Uncertain Rationality, Depth of Reasoning and Robustness in Games with Incomplete Information" by Fabrizio Germano, Jonathan Weinstein and Peio Zuazo-Garin, Barcelona School of Economics Working Paper 947, January 2017

Keywords: Incomplete Information; Rationalizability; robustness; uncertain rationality; belief hierarchies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Uncertain rationality and robustness in games with incomplete information (2015)
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