Managing Credit Bubbles
Jaume Ventura and
Alberto Martin
No 823, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics
Abstract:
We study a dynamic economy where credit is limited by insufficient collateral and, as a result, investment and output are too low. In this environment, changes in investor sentiment or market expectations can give rise to credit bubbles, that is, expansions in credit that are backed not by expectations of future profits (i.e. fundamental collateral), but instead by expectations of future credit (i.e. bubbly collateral). Credit bubbles raise the availability of credit for entrepreneurs: this is the crowding-in effect. But entrepreneurs must also use some of this credit to cancel past credit: this is the crowding-out effect. There is an "optimal" bubble size that trades off these two effects and maximizes long-run output and consumption. The equilibrium bubble size depends on investor sentiment, however, and it typically does not coincide with the "optimal" bubble size. This provides a new rationale for macroprudential policy. A credit management agency (CMA) can replicate the "optimal" bubble by taxing credit when the equilibrium bubble is too high and subsidizing credit when the equilibrium bubble is too low. This leaning-against-the-wind policy maximizes output and consumption. Moreover, the same conditions that make this policy desirable guarantee that a CMA has the resources to implement it.
Keywords: Business cycles; Bubbles; economic growth; financial frictions; pyramid schemes; credit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 E44 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
Downloads: (external link)
https://bw.bse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/823-file.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: MANAGING CREDIT BUBBLES (2016) 
Journal Article: Managing Credit Bubbles (2016) 
Working Paper: Managing credit bubbles (2015) 
Working Paper: Managing Credit Bubbles (2014) 
Working Paper: Managing Credit Bubbles (2014) 
Working Paper: Managing Credit Bubbles (2014) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:823
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bruno Guallar ().